Q17 - Because no other theory has been able to predict

[mikuo0628]

I was wondering how (D) is correct when in the stimulus, the statement that Einstein adjusted his equations to generate the correct numbers for the perihelion advance is just PROBABLE.

If the statement is stronger, perhaps instead of merely probable, it was "recently discovered (that he did adjust the numbers)" or something, making it 100%, then (D) would in my opinion be perfect.

(B), (C), and (E) were easy to remove. I feel (A) was tricky for me because it talks about crediting the theory with the discovery of the advance when the stimulus is talking about the advance supports (or not) the theory... in other words I find it irrelevant. But I could be wrong.

I got the answer right through process of elimination. But I would like to understand why it's right.

[csunnerberg13]

I struggled with this question, too, but I think the reason we both struggled is because the answer choice isn't perfect even though we would like it to be. When you think about it, though, that's a normal part of most LSAT questions. If it was as perfect as we would like, then it would be easier. Like you said, you could eliminate all of the others and get to D - so that's the right process, especially on a question where the answer isn't perfect. It's better here to know exactly why all the other choices simply don't work and therefore D is the best of our bunch...

(A) can be eliminated because it concludes with "should not be credited with the discovery of that phenomenon." That doesn't match our stimulus because in the stimulus we're just saying "it shouldn't count as evidence. We know nothing (definitively) about whether he should get credit for discovery

(B) looks pretty good, and I was stumped by this answer choice more than with A. But ultimately I got rid of it because it doesn't directly apply to the stimulus. B hinges on whether or not Einstein developed the theory with the phenomenon in mind. In our stimulus, we're rejecting the phenomenon as evidence because he probably adjusted the numbers to make them fit the theory, not because he had the phenomenon in mind. We actually don't know if he had it in mind when he was developing the theory.

(C) was a pretty easy elimination - we don't need the theory to account for ALL relevant phenomena and that IS NOT why we are rejecting the evidence as support. We're rejecting it because he probably changed the numbers.

(D) is the correct answer! And I understand your hesitancy because it isn't perfect...but think about it this way: our answer choice provides us with a conditional! That's actually great, because we have some wiggle room. We're basically just saying "IF it's true that he manipulated the numbers, then we can't count that as evidence." That's perfect - because if he didn't manipulate the evidence (as you indicated - it only says probably in the stimulus; also keep in mind though that probably means that it is more likely than not) then we don't have to apply this principle. But if he did, then our principle applies perfectly.

(E) doesn't match up because it gives us an idea about when something shouldn't be counted as predicting something...that's not what we're looking for. We want to know that it shouldn't be counted as [i}evidence for his theory.[/i]

I hope this helps!

[mikuo0628]

Ahh thanks for your thorough answer. It sure did help!

I think I see what you are getting at. Just that in the ton of "which principle best justifies the argument" questions that I did, I honestly can't recall encountering one principle as weak as this one. I always remembered principles to be broad but nonetheless very applicable to the stimulus.

After all, can you justify that "it's probably going to be cloudy; therefore it will rain" with a principle that says "if it's cloudy, it will rain"? Sounds silly doesn't it?

Then again, I guess we are picking the BEST one out of the five... that one just happens to be one that's not immediately applicable to the argument...

Thanks for your help. Good luck (if you're taking one in the future).

[csunnerberg13]

Yeah I know exactly what you mean, I'm in the habit of thinking of principles as pretty strong too - like a "super strengthener". So I guess the take away is - a principle question answer choice can seem overly strong and still be right and seem to not be completely perfect and still be right... silly LSAT.

Glad I could help a little, good luck on the test to you too

[agutman]

PT69, S4, Q17 (Principle Support)
This one is a real mouthful! As always, we should start by finding the conclusion. In this case, thankfully, it’s pretty easy to spot: accounting for this advance should not be counted as evidence in support of Einstein’s theory. What is that conclusion based on? We’re told that the advance was already well known when Einstein developed his theory, and in fact he quite probably adjusted his equations to make his theory predict the advance. From the opposing point we can figure out that "˜accounting’ for the advance is the same as "˜predicting’ it. The core looks like this:

The advance was already well known when Einstein developed his theory + he quite probably adjusted his equations so that his theory predicts the advance --> The advance should not be counted as evidence in support of Einstein’s theory.

So, if we generalize this, it seems that if a scientist adjusted her theory to predict a known phenomenon, we should not count that prediction as evidence in support of her theory.

As we consider the answer choices, let’s remember to make things easier by really focusing on how they relate to the core. The correct answer must help us conclude that predicting the advance should not be counted as evidence in support of Einstein’s theory.

(A) credited with the discovery of that phenomenon? Get rid of it.

(B) is the exact opposite of what we’re looking for. It’s saying that if Einstein had the phenomenon in mind while developing his theory then it should be counted as evidence.

(C) is out of scope; the argument is about whether a predicted phenomenon was already known, not about whether all of the relevant phenomena that were already known are accounted for.

(E) is extremely tempting. Only the very last part ruins it: the theory should not be counted as predicting that phenomenon. We wanted it to say: those predictions should not be counted as supporting the theory.

(D) looks exactly like what we were looking for! Since the other answer choices don’t match, pick it and move on.

So (D) is correct.

[terpsfball09]

I don't know if this helps anyone, but it helped me eliminate "E" (which, in my opinion, is the most tempting answer). Nowhere in the stimulus did it say that Einstein knew of the former theory when developing his own. It just states "this phenomenon was already well known when Einstein developed his theory" but that doesn't mean that Einstein knew of it.

E states that its a phenomenon that is already known to the scientist. But for the reason above, I eliminated it. It's well known to the general public, but that doesn't mean its well known to Einstein.

[jm.kahn]

I was wondering how (D) is correct when in the stimulus, the statement that Einstein adjusted his equations to generate the correct numbers for the perihelion advance is just PROBABLE.

If the statement is stronger, perhaps instead of merely probable, it was "recently discovered (that he did adjust the numbers)" or something, making it 100%, then (D) would in my opinion be perfect.

(B), (C), and (E) were easy to remove. I feel (A) was tricky for me because it talks about crediting the theory with the discovery of the advance when the stimulus is talking about the advance supports (or not) the theory... in other words I find it irrelevant. But I could be wrong.

I got the answer right through process of elimination. But I would like to understand why it's right.

Can any experts comment on the issue with "probably"?

[tommywallach]

Hey JM. It's been addressed. As was said, yes, the probable makes the question a little harder (because the right answer is a little less directly awesome), but that's all. The correct answer still remains the best of the choices.

-t

[jm.kahn]

Thanks Tommy for the response. Yeah, I read in the previous posts that it is not a perfect answer choice (obviously) and clearly it doesn't justify the argument fully.
But what is the intuition or reasoning behind such a choice helping justify the argument? E.g. it seems strange that "if John drives, then John is rich" is helping justify a stimulus "John probably drives. Therefore John is rich".

We don't know for sure that John drives. "John is rich" condition occurs and the conditional kicks in when we know for certain that "John drives". JD->JR doesn't doesn't mean "JD_likely-> JR_likely"

[tommywallach]

To your last point...sure it does!

It's entirely logical to say:

All rich people are snobs, therefore Steve (who is probably rich) is probably a snob.

That's totally fair.

-t

[HazelZ814]

PT69, S4, Q17 (Principle Support)
This one is a real mouthful! As always, we should start by finding the conclusion. In this case, thankfully, it’s pretty easy to spot: accounting for this advance should not be counted as evidence in support of Einstein’s theory. What is that conclusion based on? We’re told that the advance was already well known when Einstein developed his theory, and in fact he quite probably adjusted his equations to make his theory predict the advance. From the opposing point we can figure out that "˜accounting’ for the advance is the same as "˜predicting’ it. The core looks like this:

The advance was already well known when Einstein developed his theory + he quite probably adjusted his equations so that his theory predicts the advance --> The advance should not be counted as evidence in support of Einstein’s theory.

So, if we generalize this, it seems that if a scientist adjusted her theory to predict a known phenomenon, we should not count that prediction as evidence in support of her theory.

As we consider the answer choices, let’s remember to make things easier by really focusing on how they relate to the core. The correct answer must help us conclude that predicting the advance should not be counted as evidence in support of Einstein’s theory.

(A) credited with the discovery of that phenomenon? Get rid of it.

(B) is the exact opposite of what we’re looking for. It’s saying that if Einstein had the phenomenon in mind while developing his theory then it should be counted as evidence.

(C) is out of scope; the argument is about whether a predicted phenomenon was already known, not about whether all of the relevant phenomena that were already known are accounted for.

(E) is extremely tempting. Only the very last part ruins it: the theory should not be counted as predicting that phenomenon. We wanted it to say: those predictions should not be counted as supporting the theory.

(D) looks exactly like what we were looking for! Since the other answer choices don’t match, pick it and move on.

So (D) is correct.

----
Please correct me if I'm wrong. I don't think the logic of B should be translated as stated above. Instead, it should be: if it should be counted as evidence -- then the theory was developed with the phenomenon in mind. If we negate it, we'll get: /in mind -- /counted as evidence. The necessary condition "/counted as evidence" is exactly what we want because it matches the conclusion, however, B is wrong because the sufficient part" /in mind" goes against the argument: when developing the theory, Einstein adjusted it for the phenomenon ("adjusted his equations ... for the perihelion advance"), therefore, Einstein "had the phenomenon in mind", rather than "/in mind".

Does this make sense? Thank you.