Q25

[bigtree65]

Can someBody please explain why this is E and not A? I don't understand how A is wrong, isn't A clearly stated in lines 27-31?

[noah]

We're asked about what Dworkin would agree with. Tough to prephrase this sort of question, as there's a lot of Dworkin's opinions in this passage.

(A) is unsupported. Dworkin states in lines 27-31 that judges and lawyers act this way, but we don't hear him say they do this too much. In fact, in the next sentence we learn that Dworkin's theory will validate the practice - we can assume he's OK with it!

(B) is unsupported. We learn that Dworkin is OK with judges using their moral intuition in certain situations - lines 39-42 - but the only limitation we learn about is that they can't disregard the internal logic of the law. In the last paragraph we learn that understanding the internal logic of the law can allow us to improve upon the original authors' interpretations. So, we never learn of a conflict between the use of moral intuition and the intentions of a law's authors.

(C) is out of scope - there's no discussion of which theory is more popular. (Sounds like high school!)

(D) is contradicted. In lines 37, we learn that an interpretation can be correct even if it's not supported by a consensus.

(E) is correct. We learn early in the passage that legal positivists think that moral intuition has no place in legal thought, and then in lines 27-30 we learn that Dworkin thinks that attitude doesn't work with what actually is going on - and that his theory will validate that practice. And, later, in lines 40-44, we learn that Dworkin is OK with judges using moral intuition.

I hope that clears it up.

[bigtree65]

Yea that clears it up thanks!
I should've realized it can't be A since his theory seeks to validate their practice, aah dumb mistake.

[phoebster21]

We're asked about what Dworkin would agree with. Tough to prephrase this sort of question, as there's a lot of Dworkin's opinions in this passage.

(A) is unsupported. Dworkin states in lines 27-31 that judges and lawyers act this way, but we don't hear him say they do this too much. In fact, in the next sentence we learn that Dworkin's theory will validate the practice - we can assume he's OK with it!

(B) is unsupported. We learn that Dworkin is OK with judges using their moral intuition in certain situations - lines 39-42 - but the only limitation we learn about is that they can't disregard the internal logic of the law. In the last paragraph we learn that understanding the internal logic of the law can allow us to improve upon the original authors' interpretations. So, we never learn of a conflict between the use of moral intuition and the intentions of a law's authors.

(C) is out of scope - there's no discussion of which theory is more popular. (Sounds like high school!)

(D) is contradicted. In lines 37, we learn that an interpretation can be correct even if it's not supported by a consensus.

(E) is correct. We learn early in the passage that legal positivists think that moral intuition has no place in legal thought, and then in lines 27-30 we learn that Dworkin thinks that attitude doesn't work with what actually is going on - and that his theory will validate that practice. And, later, in lines 40-44, we learn that Dworkin is OK with judges using moral intuition.

I hope that clears it up.

Quick Question:
For answer C, line 12 states, "legal positivism, the more popular of the two theories, holds that law and ..." As such, I actually chose C because I took the following two phrases "to be resolved by registering a consensus, not by deciding what is morally right" and "the judge's interpretive role is limited to.." to mean "simplif[ing] the judge's role."

Can you please clarify where my reasoning or interpretation went askew?

[AmyH231]

Hi!

So the line definitely does specify that legal positivism is "the more popular of the two theories" but the paragraph does not touch on WHY this is. It is too much of a leap that to decide legal positivism is popular BECAUSE "[t]he judge's interpretive role is limited" since there is no discussion or meditation on the popularity. Legal positivism could be popular because of the limited role of the judge (which is not exactly a simplification--especially if a judge has a strong moral conviction)--but it could also be the more popular theory because it's trendier at the top universities, or a Supreme Court judge champions it, or legal positivists all get really cool blazers. We don't know anything about the reason behind its popularity, and in this essay Dworkin only suggests that people are attracted to positivism because they hate natural law--he doesn't talk about simplifying judges roles in relation to this "erroneous theory."